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Following the introduction of competition and deregulation in the 
telecommunications industry, China has witnessed remarkable growth of 
telecommunications subscribers since the mid 1990s. Taking this as the 
background, this thesis sets up two fixed-effect models to examine the impact of 
competition and deregulation on the growth of subscribers in China’s fixed-line 
and mobile markets during 1990–2004. In particular, these two models integrate 
diffusion as a technological nature of the growth of telecommunications 
subscribers, while the combined effects of diffusion, competition, and 
deregulation on the growth of China’s telecommunications subscribers are also 
investigated. The results of this study are as follows: 1) The growth of China’s 
telecommunications subscribers in general presents strong diffusion 
characteristics, these characteristics in turn accelerated the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers. 2) The introduction of competition largely 
accelerates the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers by enhancing its diffusion 
characteristic. 3) The introduction of deregulation is found to accelerate the 
growth of China’s mobile subscribers through also enhancing diffusion. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Objectives and Scope of Study 
China’s telecommunications industry has experienced a series of deep changes 
since 1994, when competition and deregulation were first introduced into this area. 
Major events concerning telecommunications competition and deregulation during 
this period were as follows. In 1994, China’s telecommunications market was 
broken free from the former monopoly of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) and its commercial arm China Telecom. Following 
this move, five state-owned major telecommunications operators were established 
to compete with one another in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets. In 1998, 
the Ministry of Information Industries (MII) was founded. MII replaced MPT’s 
intensive surveillance with independent regulation, providing telecommunications 
operators with greater economic autonomy. Moreover, upon China’s access to 
WTO in 2001, China committed to opening its domestic telecommunications 
market to foreign investors by 2007. After 2004, all state-owned major 
telecommunications operators split away from ministries, and were placed under 
the management of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), pushing deregulation into a new stage. 
 
Since these profound changes, China’s telecommunications market has been 
growing very quickly in the number of subscribers. Between 1990–2006, China’s 
fixed-line subscribers increased from 6.85 million to 312.44 million, while mobile 
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subscribers increased from 18,000 to 334.83 million, creating two steep S-shape 
growth curves as seen in Figure 1. As Figure 1 shows, the take-off points of these 
two growth curves are located in the mid and late 1990s, and the growth curve of 
China’s mobile subscribers is much steeper than the growth curve of fixed-line 
subscribers. In 1995, China’s mobile subscribers only accounted for lower than 
9% of fixed-line subscribers. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, China’s mobile 
subscribers quickly caught up with and exceeded fixed-line subscribers in 2003. 
By the end of 2006, the number of mobile subscribers in China was more than 
125% of the number of fixed-line subscribers.  
 































Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2006. 
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By early 2007, China’s telecoms market, which had been the world’s largest since 
2002 in terms of subscribers, saw its fixed-line subscriber base exceed 371 million, 
and its mobile subscriber base grow to over 487 million. In addition to this, there 
were more than 90 million PHS (Personal Handyphone System, also know as Xiao 
Lingtong) limited mobility services in China. 
 
Which factors determined the magical growth of China’s telecommunications 
subscribers? Learning from the experience of global telecommunications 
development, considerable attention has been devoted to competition and 
deregulation in the telecommunications industry. In related country-specific and 
region-specific studies, the impact of competition and deregulation on the 
telecommunications growth were examined through the use of numerous 
empirical tests. Overall, competition and deregulation were found to have 
different effects on telecommunications growth across different countries, 
different regions, and different sectors. Competition and deregulation have also 
been intensively discussed in studies on China’s telecommunications industry. 
However, empirical evidence was rarely provided to check the effects of these 
initiatives on China’s telecommunications growth in subscribers, and this growth 
was hardly ever verified as a diffusion process. This explains why the industry’s 
inherent diffusion characteristics, which can be simplified as non-linear 
interactions between existing telecommunications subscriber bases and potential 




This thesis intends to fill that gap. The main objective of this study is to identify 
how competition and deregulation have impacted China’s telecommunications 
growth in subscribers. To simplify the analysis process, China’s 
telecommunications market in this paper only relates to China’s domestic 
fixed-line market and mobile markets. In these two markets, telecommunications 
growth is measured by the growth of subscribers, and is investigated as a diffusion 
process.  
 
To further clarify the boundaries of market players and services categories 
covered by this thesis, only China Telecom, China Netcom, and China Railcom 
have been recognized as fixed-line operators, while China Mobile, China Unicom, 
China Telecom, and China Netcom have been recognized as mobile operators. 
Accordingly, fixed-line services include local, domestic long-distance, and 
international telephone services, while Internet services have been excluded. 
Mobile services include GSM, CDMA, GPRS, and PHS businesses, while paging 
services have not been included in this study. 
 
The remainder of this thesis unfolds as follows. Chapter 1 briefly introduces the 
rapid growth of China’s telecommunications market. Chapter 2 reviews theories 
of telecommunications growth, and some empirical findings on the impact of 
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competition and deregulation on the global telecommunications industry. Chapter 
3 summarizes major events involved in the increased competition and 
deregulation of China’s domestic fixed-line and mobile markets. Chapter 4 
conducts an econometric analysis of city-level data in fixed-line and mobile 
markets, which takes telecommunications growth as a diffusion process. Finally, 
Chapter 5 offers a concluding remark and implications for public policy. 
 
1.2 Rapid Growth of China’s Telecommunications Market 
The growth rate of China’s telecommunications subscribers was much higher than 
the world’s average rate from 1992–2004. As Figure 2 presents, during 1992–2004, 
the number of fixed-line subscribers in China rose at a yearly mean of 32.55%, 
compared to the world’s average level of 6.55%. During the same period, the 
number of mobile subscribers in China saw an average growth rate of 108.79%, 
while the world’s average level was 44.32%. Particularly between 1992 and 1996, 
the growth of China’s mobile subscribers created a steep peak (see Figure 2) due 
to the high volume and high speed of the initial subscription for mobile services in 
China. During initial subscription, operators offered extremely cheap or even free 
services to attract subscribers, and the diffusion of mobile services quickly 
expanded the number of mobile subscribers, from 17.7 million in 1992, to 685.3 
million in 1996. By 1996, the S-shape growth curve for mobile subscribers had 
already passed the take-off point, while mobile services had become more 
prevalent, and the growth of mobile subscribers had slowed down and become 
more stable. Up until 2004, China’s mobile subscribers kept increasing faster than 
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the global average, although the gap between them gradually narrowed. 
 
 

























































The great leap in the number of fixed-line and mobile subscribers resulted in the 
remarkable rise of China’s telecommunications market. At the end of 1990, the 
number of China’s telecommunications subscribers was the same size as most 
developing countries. However, by the end of 2004, China had already become the 
largest telecommunications market in the world. Furthermore, China’s 
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telecommunications infrastructures had realized extraordinary expansion. Up to 
November 2006, 98.8% of China’s administrative villages had opened telephone 
services. This coverage has been raised to 99.5% by 2007 (MII, 2008). As for 
China’s fixed-line infrastructures, long-distance switchers increased more than 
100 times, while long-distance optical cables increased 375 times from 
1990–2004. These constituted the national trunks and connected all provinces and 
major cities. The most significant achievement was the huge expansion in the total 
capacity of China’s mobile switchers, which increased more than 10,000 times 
during the same period. At present, China has the largest PSTN and the largest 
GSM networks in the world. 
 
However, some indicators have shown that China’s telecommunications industry 
is still backward in several aspects. For instance, China’s teledensity (Main 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) increased from 1.10% to 23.98% from 
1990–2004. This reflected definite progress, but this growth was still on the same 
level as other developing countries (See Figure 3). Compared to 1990 teledensity 
figures for developed countries above 30% and 2004 teledensity above 40%, 












Figure 3: China’s teledensity, 1990–2004. 
 
Source: ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theories of Telecommunications Growth 
2.1.1 Diffusion Features of Telecommunications Growth 
Like electricity, water supply and transportation systems, telecommunications has 
become a critical structural precondition for the whole economy of a nation. 
Telecommunications has unique functions to strategically increase the capability 
and efficiency of exchanging knowledge and information. As Stiglitz (1989) 
claimed, in an imperfect market, knowledge and information are essential 
intermediates influencing production, consumption, and decisions. Through 
improving the exchange of knowledge and information, the telecommunications 
network feeds the diffusion of technologies and innovations. It provides the other 
sectors in the economy with numerous possibilities to employ the latest 
technologies at lower costs and higher speeds than with traditional approaches. 
 
Most especially, telecommunications has a distinctive feature of network 
externalities. In a telecommunications network, subscribers not only benefit from 
receiving or sending information to another subscriber, but also benefit from the 
continually growing opportunities of contacting other potential subscribers. That 
is, when communication among telecommunications subscribers is established, 
technologies, knowledge, and usage experiences of telecommunications services 
will be widely shared among subscribers over time. This process is a diffusion 
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process, during which a huge number of opportunities for attracting new 
subscribers can be created through current subscribers’ exchange of knowledge 
and information. 
 
Therefore, individual demands on telecommunications services are actually 
interdependent. According to the interdependent demand theory (Artle and 
Averous 1973; Squire 1973; Rohlfs 1974), there are multiple equilibriums of 
subscription. These equilibriums can be presented as sets of subscribers consistent 
with all individuals (existing subscribers and potential subscribers).  First, we 
assume V is the value of the potential telecommunications market to individual 
subscriber, and V distributes uniformly from 0 to 1. We also assume r is the 
proportion of existing subscribers, who estimate the value of telecommunications 
network to them to be more than V . Thus, we will arrive at the formula: 
rVVr −=−= 11/)1( . And for a marginal subscriber who expects benefits, we 
get: 2)1( rrrrVr −=−=× . 
 
Following this formula, we can draw an inverse-U curve as in Figure 4. Given a 
certain price P , there are two equilibriums A  and B . When the subscription 
ratio is lower than the first equilibrium point A , telecommunications operators 
have to subsidize the subscription cost or lower down the subscription price to 
attract potential subscribers. At this stage, the number of existing subscribers is 
small and grows slowly. Between A  and B , more and more subscribers joined 
the network. The subscription ratio increases fast and the growth speed of number 
of subscribers also increases. When the subscription ratio passed the second 
equilibrium point B , it becomes more and more difficult to let all individuals 
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subscribe telecommunications services unless the subscription cost P  declined.  
 
Based on the trend of subscription ratio, we can add a new curve in Figure 4 to 
show the S-shape growth trajectory of the number of telecommunications 
subscribers.  
 
Figure 4. Marginal benefit of subscription and S-shape diffusion trajectory of 
subscriber’s growth. 
 
Source: Rogers, Everett, M. Diffusion of Innovations, 2003. 
 
In Figure 4, A and B stand for the multiple equilibrium of subscription at the same 
cost level P . Both of them imply the “critical mass” in telecommunications 
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growth (Allen, 1988; Hayashi, 1988). Divided by two critical masses, 
telecommunications growth, as a diffusion process measured by the growth of 
subscribers, consists of three stages. The critical masses and three growth stages 
have been comprehensively discussed in Hayashi’s (1992) paper on network 
externalities and interconnection. 
 
The first stage starts from the initial point to A . During this period, the marginal 
benefit to become a telecommunications subscriber is much lower than the 
subscription cost, due to the small scale of current subscribers. To attract potential 
subscribers, telecommunications operators must invest heavily to build a huge 
network and maintain a low subscription fee. During this period, a substantial 
sunk cost hinders the entry of private and small operators, while a natural 
monopoly is suitable to afford the expansion of telecommunications 
infrastructures because of strong economies of scale. Since there are insufficient 
subscribers to diffuse information, technology and usage experiences, the growth 
rate of subscribers is very low. 
 
The second stage is between two critical mass points A  and B . After the first 
critical mass, subscription benefits increase quickly because the expanding 
network attracts more subscribers. Interconnection between different subscribers 
increases the opportunity of accessing different kinds of telecommunications 
technologies. Various communications demands from various telecommunications 
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technologies push one another toward a larger scale. At the same time, large 
telecommunications networks reduce operational costs. Before touching the 
turning point of the S-shaped diffusion trajectory, the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers enters a rapid take-off stage. 
 
This rapid growth continues until it passes the turning point and approaches the 
second critical mass point at B . Here, telecommunications services coverage has 
reached a high level, and it has become increasingly more difficult and costly to 
detect potential subscribers that are not covered by existing telecommunications 
services. Moreover, competition is intensified by the mass of overlapping 
telecommunications services. As a result, the growth in the number of 
telecommunications subscribers becomes steady.  
 
The S-shape diffusion pattern composed of the three consecutive phases can also 
be observed to occur in other technologies. On the one hand, physical or chemical 
constraints may limit the ultimate performance of individual technology. On the 
other hand, the customer base also has its upper limits. Thus, when a technology is 
new, growth is slow because of initial difficulties. Once these are overcome, or in 
other words once the critical mass is met, growth in performance is rapid. As the 
upper limit is approached, additional increments in performance become more 
difficult, and therefore reduce the growth rate. However, diffusion is extremely 
significant in telecommunications growth, because telecommunications services 
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are focused on improving the exchange of information and technologies, which 
largely facilitates the diffusion process. 
 
2.1.2 Logistic Curve and Gompertz Curve 
There are two growth curves heavily adopted in simulating growth following the 
S-shape diffusion process: the Logistic curve and the Gompertz curve. These 
curves can also be used to capture the diffusion effects in the growth of 
subscribers in the telecommunications industry. 
 
Let Y represent the number of subscribers, i represent the city, and t  represent 









where tiY , is defined as the number of subscribers in city i  in year t , and iA  
and iB are positive parameters for specific cities controlling the shape of the 
Logistic curve. 












Further, we assume that 0,iY is the number of subscribers in city i  in year 0=t , 













































































































































































































where iii BAL /=  is a constant value, which can be simply shown as the upper 
limit of tiY ,  since ∞→t , iti LY →, . 
 


















m . It can be seen that the Logistic curve is symmetric about its 
inflection point, where 2/
, iti LY = , or ii Amt /)(ln= . To get a linear form of this 
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As for the Gompertz curve, we assume that tiY ,  is the number of subscribers in 
city i  in year t . In addition, we assume that the growth of subscribers has a 







= . This form is different from the Logistic curve, but both Logistic 
curve and Gompertz curve are prevailing forecast tools to match the S-shape 
diffusion curve. tiA , is assumed to follow
tk
iti
ieAA −= 0,, , where 0,iA  is the initial 
growth speed of subscribers in city i  in year 0=t  and ik  is a positive 
parameter. 
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YY 0,0,, exp , this can be deemed as the growth 
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From this equation, we learn that the Gompertz curve is not symmetrical. Its 
inflection point is at ( ) ii kmt /ln= , where eLY iti /, = . 
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It is worth noting that both equation  and  are in linear form. However, these 
 
two equations actually integrate endogenous non-linear relationships between 
tiY , and 1, −tiY , which follow the S-shape diffusion curves described by the Logistic 
and Gompertz models. Therefore, taking the left side of equation  and  as 
 
dependent variables, the right sides of these two equations can be used in 
regressions to estimate the diffusion embedded in the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers. 
 
2.1.3 Empirical Evidence of Telecommunications Diffusion 
Previous empirical studies on telecommunications diffusion have typically posed 
three questions: 1) Do the diffusion characteristics of telecommunications growth 
have empirical significance or not? 2) How does telecommunications growth 
exhibit these diffusion characteristics under different conditions, such as different 
growth stages and penetration rates? 3) How have competition and deregulation 
affected telecommunications diffusion? Some typical studies related to these three 




Using the data from the World Bank of the period 1989–1999, Bagchi et al. (2003) 
conducted an empirical study on the subscription of fixed-line telephone services 
and mobile services in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. The 
purpose of their study was to reveal the effects of macroeconomic conditions, 
privatization, and telecommunications diffusion on fixed-line and mobile 
subscriptions in LAC countries. They pooled data into a panel of time series from 
31 LAC country units, and used year and country dummies to construct a 
fixed-effect model. In particular, they used the number of telephone main and 
mobile phone lines as the dependent variables, and the Gompertz formula as the 
analytical tool to approximate the diffusion of telecommunications services during 
subscription. Eventually, they found that macro-economic conditions and 
privatization were important factors affecting telecommunications growth, but that 
these effects were not consistently positive or significant. Instead, the coefficients 
of diffusion in both fixed-line and mobile sectors were always positive and highly 
significant, implying that telecommunications growth has strong diffusion 
characteristics.  
 
Bagchi et al. (2003) claimed that it should be easy to see the diffusion effect in 
such countries as those in LAC that were in the early stages of 
telecommunications subscription. The diffusion effect, according to their 
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explanation, can be exhibited as a force accelerating the future growth of 
telecommunications subscribers through the existing user base. They pointed out 
that different countries were in different stages in the S-shape diffusion curve, and 
so the significance of diffusion characteristics in these countries’ 
telecommunications growth would also be seen to be different. Generally, 
countries in the early diffusion stage with a low penetration rate will show strong 
diffusion characteristics, which will push these countries into a high speed so as to 
catch up. Conversely, countries at late diffusion stages with a high penetration rate 
may indicate a slowdown in subscription, where the diffusion effect is negligible. 
Bagchi et al. (2003) also noted in their study that the growth rate of 
telecommunications subscribers reaches the peak when the penetration rate 
achieves 37%. After that, the growth rate of telecommunications subscribers 
gradually declines. Thus, 37% can be deemed as the turning point of the S-shape 
diffusion trajectory for telecommunications subscribers in their particular study.  
 
Roller and Waverman (2001) got different results in their empirical study on the 
impact of telecommunications infrastructures on economic growth in 21 OECD 
countries from 1971–1990. In this study, they intended to investigate how 
telecommunications infrastructures investments and derived services led to 
benefits in other economic sectors. They formulated three micro models: 1) The 
number of telephone mainlines as a function of telecommunications investment, 
income, and price of telephone services, 2) The telecommunications investment as 
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a function of the price of telephone services, and a list of existing variables, and 3) 
The growth of telephone mainlines as a function of telecommunications 
investment and the stock of telecommunications infrastructures. The authors then 
went on to integrate these three micro models into an aggregate product function 
of the whole economy to replace the indicator of telecommunications 
infrastructures, which was represented by the number of telephone mainlines. 
They further divided their observations into three groups: 1) The low penetration 
group, where penetration rate  20%, 2) The medium penetration group, where 
20% < penetration rate  40%, and 3) The high penetration group, where 
penetration rate  40%. Controlling for country-fixed effects, they found countries 
with a penetration rate higher than 40% showed a significantly larger impact of 
telecommunications infrastructures on aggregate economic growth than with other 
countries. 
 
Roller and Waverman (2001) reported that the impact of telecommunications 
infrastructures on economic growth was non-linear. They explained that, the 
nonlinearities could be attributed to the existence of network externalities in 
telecommunications. Hence, telecommunications growth could be seen as a 
diffusion process par excellence. If that is the case, the diffusion characteristics of 
telecommunications growth will be much more significant when the scale of a 
telecommunications network achieves a certain critical mass on the S-shape 
diffusion curve. In the context of their study, the critical mass would correspond to 
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40% of the penetration rate. Since most developing countries are under the level 
of 40% in their penetration rate, it should be more difficult to observe a strong 
diffusion effect of telecommunications growth in developing countries. 
 
However, Roller and Waverman (2001) did not include the mobile sector in their 
study. Instead, Gruber (2001) studied the growth of mobile subscribers in Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, through which he wanted to unravel the 
determinants of the diffusion of mobile services. He adopted the annual data of 
mobile subscribers in 10 CEE countries from the year when they first introduced 
mobile services up to the end of 1997. In his econometrics analysis, he used both 
the Logistic and Gompertz models to simulate the S-shape growth track of mobile 
subscribers and used the diffusion effect, income, economic transition, 
urbanization, and number of operators as independent variables. 
 
Ultimately, Gruber (2001) reported that income and urbanization variables did not 
have a significant impact on mobile diffusion. On the contrary, the diffusion effect 
was significant. Moreover, both the Logistic and Gompertz models confirmed that 
passing from a monopoly to a duopoly accelerated the speed of diffusion, and the 
number of mobile subscribers further expanded with the increasing number of 
operators. Gruber (2001) claimed that, in this process, competition was introduced 
into these telecommunications markets by allowing new entries. CEE countries 
were also undergoing the economic transformation from centrally planned 
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economies to market economies. However, Cruber (2001) found the effects of 
economic transition were not significant, although traditional centralized 
monopoly control over the CEE countries’ telecommunications market was 
realized through deregulation processes. The results of Gruber’s (2001) 
investigation provided support for the view that competition accelerates 
telecommunications diffusion. However, it is difficult to say whether deregulation 
has similar effects on telecommunications diffusion. 
 
In general, existing studies have confirmed that telecommunications growth has 
significant diffusion characteristics. The significance of diffusion characteristics 
on telecommunications growth would be much easier to detect in countries at the 
early stage of telecommunications development, or with a relatively low 
penetration rate. In addition, competition was found to improve 
telecommunications diffusion, while the role of deregulation was not certain. The 
interesting point is that, two of these conditions were fulfilled in China’s 
telecommunications market from 1990–2004: the early stage of 
telecommunications development and the relatively low penetration rate. Thus, it 
is possible that the diffusion effect was significant in China’s fixed-line and 
mobile markets from 1990–2004, while the impact of competition and 
deregulation is not yet certain. 
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2.2 Global Telecommunications Development 
Historically, telecommunications has been defined as a natural monopoly, due to 
its inherent technological characteristics. That is, telecommunications business has 
a tendency toward continuously declining long run average costs, huge sunk costs, 
a large minimum efficient size, and other features that limit the number of 
operators. As a result, in the history of many countries’ telecommunications 
development, a monopolistic structure has prevailed, following the guideline that 
there was room for only one operator to fully exploit the available economies of 
scale, and supply the telecommunications market. In addition, for the sake of 
social welfare and information security, government and state agencies usually 
maintained intensive surveillance on telecommunications operators. In some cases, 
governments were even both the monitor of telecommunications market and the 
owner of telecommunications operators.  
 
Before the 1980s, the major technological characteristics of telecommunications 
did not fundamentally alter, and worldwide telecommunications industries 
remained dormant, centralized, and state-owned monopolies. However, since the 
1980s, the progress in fixed-line and mobile technologies has drastically reshaped 
the nature of telecommunications. In particular, the take-off of the Internet- and 
IP- (Internet Protocol) based voice services has provided a new platform from 
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which to integrate various telecommunications services with low fixed costs and a 
high expansion rate. Mobile services have also offered tremendous flexible 
solutions for public communication with low fixed costs, high convenience, and 
dynamic content. Especially, new subscription of mobile services does not require 
establishing new fixed connection to the local loop as fixed-line services. 
Therefore, it is easier for mobile operators to attract certain amount of subscribers 
to break through the critical mass with much lower cost compared with fixed-line 
services. Compared with fixed-line services, whose high cost of constructing local 
loops decided that operators prefer monopoly control of local loops to achieve 
economy of scale, mobile services operators will prefer free market environment. 
 
These technologies have profoundly undermined the natural monopolistic 
character of traditional telecommunications services, enabling operators to reach 
an efficient size, and quickly regain a meaningful return on their initial 
investments. 
 
Technological break-throughs have come alongside a free market ideology since 
the 1980s. When many countries began to transform their telecommunications 
industry, deregulation and pro-competition became key policy orientations. 
Deregulation and pro-competition policies spread from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan, to a wide range of developed and developing 
countries. In 1984 and 1985, the three largest monopolistic telecommunications 
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operators, AT&T (American Telephone & Telegraph Company) in the United 
States, BT (British Telecommunications plc) in the United Kingdom, and NTT 
(Nippon Telephone & Telegraph) in Japan, all lost their monopolies. National and 
regional deregulation policies such as the 1996 United States Telecommunications 
Act and European Community Directives continued this trend throughout the 
1990s. These policies aimed at removing regulatory restrictions on 
telecommunications operators, so as to encourage efficient business operations in 
the telecommunications market.  
 
During the 1990s, almost all developed countries and many developing countries 
in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia experienced 
telecommunications reform through breaking monopolies, releasing centralized 
control, introducing competition, or establishing new regulation systems. The 
1998 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
spurred this wave, encouraging countries to open up domestic telecommunications 
markets to foreign investors. According to ITU (International Telecommunications 
Union) statistics, up until 1990, around 35% of international telephone traffic was 
open to competition. This figure jumped to 74% in 1998 and 85% in 2005.  
 
Following the worldwide wave of telecommunications deregulation and 
competition, the telecommunications industry outperformed the overall market 
during the 1990s, a decade of tremendous growth. Relative worldwide prosperity, 
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a mostly peaceful environment, economic globalization, and diversified 
telecommunications services evoked the boom in telecommunications demands. 
Basic and advanced communication services became an increasingly high priority 
for both businesses and consumers. Exploding telecommunications demands 
versus existing insufficient infrastructures brought abundant opportunities for 
telecommunications expansion. Taking the United States as an example, its total 
voice and data service revenues reached nearly $270 billion in 1999, accounting 
for about 30% of the total world service revenues. In March 2000, American 
telecommunications equipment and service providers combined market caps 
totaled $2.7 trillion. 
 
2.3 Empirical Findings of Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation 
2.3.1 Telecommunications Competition 
There is still protracted discussion on competition’s role in the 
telecommunications industry. The core question in this discussion is whether 
competition improves the performance of telecommunications operators or the 
telecommunications market more effectively than a monopoly. To answer this 
question, Grzybowski (2006), Ulset (2007), Ros (1999), Wallsten (1999), 
Armstrong (1997), and Jha and Mahumdar (1999) have implemented 
comprehensive studies on the impact of competition on telecommunications 
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performance and the structural features of telecommunications competition. 
 
Grzybowski (2006) conducted an empirical study on the competitiveness of 
mobile services in the European Union. The objective of his study was to analyze 
the impact of a set of pro-competitive regulatory policies and the liberalization of 
the fixed-line market on prices and the demand for mobile services. His 
cross-country study used a structural model developed by Parker and Röller (1997) 
to analyze both the supply and demand aspects of mobile services. In this model, 
mobile operators in every country were assumed to compete in quantities, to have 
the same technology level and to use static strategies. The country-level data 
tested by this model come from the databases of ITU and Eurostat. The data 
involve the number of mobile subscribers, the penetration rate and price of mobile 
services, the number of mobile operators, the regulator dummies of 
pro-competition policies, and so on. These data were pooled into a group of 
European Union countries from 1998–2000. After the estimation with a 
fixed-effect assumption, Grzybowski (2006) found that pro-competitive regulatory 
policies, such as the introduction of number portability, and the liberalization of 
the fixed-line market to new operators had significant negative effects on mobile 
prices, and considerable positive effects on the demand for mobile services. These 
results demonstrate that telecommunications competition can improve the 
performance of operators. 
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In point of fact, as Ulset (2007) declared in his study on five major 
telecommunications operators in American and European markets, effective 
telecommunications competition could place pressure on operators to force them 
to raise their efficiency. In particular, competition spurred operators to focus on 
market demands, to reduce costs and to lower prices. As Ros (1999) inferred, 
through competition, telecommunications operators could get information from 
the market about the market demand and opinions on their cost, which provided 
the basic knowledge for them to adjust input and cost management. Thus, 
operators attempted to lower their per-unit cost to gain more profits as the market 
price declined, increasing the market demand and accelerating 
telecommunications growth. From this point of view, telecommunications 
competition should have positive effects on telecommunications performance. 
Essentially, as Gruber and Verboven (2000) declared, after technology innovations 
weakened the traditional argument of economies of scale in the 
telecommunications industry, a natural monopoly was no longer the only choice to 
ensure the efficient performance of the telecommunications market. Instead, 
telecommunications competition had become a common phenomenon. 
 
Even in telecommunications sectors with a strong monopolistic nature, such as the 
fixed-line sector, competition was found to be effective in improving the 
performance of this market. Relying on ITU’s country-level data, Wallsten (1999) 
conducted an empirical study on telecommunications performance in 30 African 
 29 
and Latin American countries through 1984–1997. The purpose of Wallsten’s 
study was to explore the effects of competition and other regulatory factors on the 
telecommunications performance of these countries. He used the number of 
telephone mainlines per capita as the indicator of telecommunications 
performance, which is most widely available in various kinds of 
telecommunications statistics. In this study, competition was measured by the 
number of mobile operators in the same country not owned by the incumbents. 
This is not a perfect indicator of competition, but the number of mobile operators 
provided did offer a benchmark comparison to the incumbents, and new entries 
could spur incumbents to improve their performance (Wallsten, 1999).  
 
Wallsten (1999) used a fixed-effect model to control country-specific factors, and 
year dummies to control time trends. Ultimately, the competition variable was 
found to be significantly associated with the increase of the per capita number of 
telephone mainlines and a decrease in the price of local calls. Wallsten (1999) 
further controlled for the presence of other types of competition. The number of 
competitors associated with telecommunications performance was still 
significantly positive, suggesting that even the change of market structure alone 
could bring benefits.  
 
Telecommunications competition also has its own structures. Armstrong (1997) 
divided telecommunications competition into two categories: asymmetric 
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competition and symmetric competition. Asymmetric competition usually contains 
strong elements of natural monopoly. A single operator controls the network and is 
connected with all customers, while other operators must have access to the single 
operator to deliver their services to their customers. Symmetric competition, on 
the other hand, does not possess the strong elements of a natural monopoly. It 
assumes that all operators are directly connected with their consumers, and that 
each operator has a monopoly of their own network. In this case, every operator 
needs access to other operators’ subscribers. Armstrong (1997) claimed that, in the 
first style, the incumbent company is able to distort competition based on its 
market power. In this way, an increase in the number of competitors may not 
drastically threaten the incumbent company. In the second style, more operators 
would mean that it would be much easier to bring about serious competition.  
 
Jha and Mahumdar (1999) added that, sometimes, the positive effects of 
telecommunications competition might not be as strong as people have assumed. 
They explained that the effects of telecommunications competition might be 
exaggerated, since telecommunications growth is a diffusion process, which has 
the inherent ability to achieve rapid growth. Under a large-scale network, the 
marginal cost of operating additional accesses will be significantly reduced by the 
spillover of knowledge and usage experiences, which in turn will result in a rapid 
expansion in telecommunications volume. Technological and administrative costs 
would then be shared by the entire network. Jha and Mahumdar (1999) further 
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indicated that the strong growth of the macro economy would also boost the 
growth of total revenue and volume of the telecommunications industry, which 
may make competition appear to be more effective.  
 
In summary, it is generally accepted that telecommunications competition 
improves telecommunications performance. However, in some 
telecommunications sectors with strong features of a natural monopoly, such as 
the fixed-line market, asymmetric competition between operators may not exert 
significant positive effects on their performance. Moreover, strong 
macro-economic conditions may sometimes exaggerate the power of 
telecommunications competition. 
 
2.3.2 Telecommunications Deregulation 
Similar to competition, deregulation has drawn much attention with its apparent 
impact on telecommunications growth. However, the role of deregulation in 
driving telecommunications growth is still not clear. 
 
Monopoly and full state control over the telecommunications market were always 
considered as major reasons that contributed to appalling performance, that 
is—high prices, low efficiency, poor incentives, insufficient development, and 
unsatisfied service quantities (Wellenius et al., 1992; Noll, 1998; Wallsten, 1999; 
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Gebreab, 2002). Therefore, the driving objectives for improving industry 
performance pushed policy makers to look for new ways to replace monopoly and 
state control over this market. Since the eventual break-up of AT&T-Bells’ system 
in the United States in the early 1980s, a large number of countries have adopted 
deregulation methods, so as to remove regulatory restrictions on operators, 
implement new incentives to entrants, and split incumbent state-owned 
monopolies into their respective telecommunications sectors (Kay et al., 1986; 
Kahn, 1988; Bradley, 1992; Beesley, 1997; Lal et al., 2001). 
 
In particular, the 1984 telecommunications restructuring in the United States 
broke up the monopolistic Bell System into seven independent regional Bell 
operating companies (RBOCs). This was supposed to open up deregulation in the 
American long-distance telephone services market. In the 1980s–1990s, 
deregulation spread through the European Union. The privatization of state-owned 
monopolists, the reduction of entry barriers, and high autonomy granted to 
telecommunications operators were introduced in the United Kingdom from 1984. 
Similar policies were adopted by the Netherlands and Spain from the late 1980s, 
and in France, Germany and Italy in the late 1990s. During this period, European 
countries clearly shifted their stance from primarily state-controlled monopoly 
toward market-oriented structures (Hood et al., 1993; Brierly, 1997; Bangemann, 
1997; Lal et al., 2001). Through deregulation, restrictions on telecommunications 




Daßler et al. (2001) used ITU and FCC data to examine the impact of deregulation 
on the performance of dominant telecommunications operators in Europe and the 
United States from 1978–1998. Their study attempted to check whether the two 
important components of telecommunications deregulation—market liberalization 
and privatization—had improved European telecommunications operators’ 
efficiency.  In their empirical study, they measured the performance of dominant 
telecommunications operators by two sets of productivity indices: labor 
productivity and total factor productivity. The output index of both of these two 
indices were represented by the number of telephone mainlines. Finally, Daßler et 
al. (2001) found that neither the actual introduction nor the anticipation of 
deregulation was consistently associated with an improvement in labor 
productivity or total factor productivity. This result indicated that it could not be 
confirmed that deregulation policies in European and American 
telecommunications sectors necessarily improved telecommunications 
performance. 
 
However, wire-based networks, such as local and long-distance telephones, have 
significant economies of scale that would favor monopolistic operation and 
centralized regulation. Thus, it is possible that, in these telecommunications 
sectors, deregulation would not be found to have significant positive effects on an 
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operator’s performance. Scholars (Smith 1997; Noll 1998; Wallsten 1999; 
Armstrong 1999) have also suggested that the telecommunications industry could 
permit multiple operators and high autonomy in sectors where economies of scale 
were not significant, especially in radio-based service sectors such as the mobile 
sector. In these sectors, both entry and operational costs are lower than those in 
wire-based sectors, ensuring that incumbent operators can hardly block new 
entrants and maintain monopoly position. Therefore, deregulation should be more 
effective in providing incentives for new entrants to fully exploit their potential 
for utilizing market resources, and a competitive market structure should also be 
easier to establish without any strong intervention from monopolizing powers. 
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Chapter 3: Competition and Deregulation in China’s Telecommunications 
Industry 
 
3.1 From Monopoly to Multiple Operators 
Before 1994, China’s telecommunications industry was under a central planning 
system, where MPT was the sole controller and operator in China’s 
telecommunications services market. China’s central government, the State 
Council, recognized that telecommunications was a strategic pivot of the national 
economy (Liang 2002). Accordingly, MPT was granted the privilege of 
exclusively controlling China’s telecommunications services market. On the one 
hand, MPT established its national hierarchy, through which local affiliate 
enterprises of MPT maintained a close tie with MPT’s local branches, Post and 
Telecommunications Administrations (PTAs) (Mueller and Tan 1997). On the 
other hand, MPT implemented monopoly control of China’s telecommunications 
services market through its commercial arm, China Telecom. However, other 
ministries involved in the telecommunications manufacturing sector were not 
allowed to provide public telecommunications services. As a result, the 
unbalanced assignment of economic rights in the telecommunications industry 
laid down the source of economic conflict between MPT and these ministries 
(Mueller and Tan 1997; Harwit 1998; Harwit and Clark 2001).  
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Inter-ministry economic conflicts eventually forced the State Council to loosen its 
centralized control of China’s telecommunications industry. Since the open door 
policy of 1979, the boosted Chinese economy has brought about the rapid 
expansion of telecommunications demand. A lucrative market emerged, and other 
ministries involved in the telecommunications industry also wanted their share of 
the market. Thus, economic conflicts between MPT and these ministries deepened. 
The Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI) constituted a coalition with other 
ministries to challenge MPT for the market, and the tension in the MPT-MEI 
coalition extended to political debate on the restructuring of the 
telecommunications market (Ure 1994). To reconcile these economic conflicts, the 
State Council permitted various ministries to build their own dedicated networks, 
beginning in the early 1990s (Zhang 2002). 
 
However, economic conflicts between MPT and MEI coalition intensified as the 
telecommunications demand kept increasing, and the monopoly status of MPT 
had not been materially threatened. MPT still dominated China’s 
telecommunications services market while new networks built by other ministries 
were limited to certain industries and user groups. Ministries that were permitted 
to build their dedicated networks also began to construct their own national 
hierarchies to maintain a close nexus between government and enterprises 
(Mueller and Tan 1997). Finally, the State Council began to fundamentally change 
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the market structure. In 1994, the State Council permitted the foundation of China 
Unicom, which was backed by MEI, Ministry of Railroad (MOR), Ministry of 
Electrical Power (MEP) and other 13 state-owned enterprises (Zhang 2002). This 
event declared the breakup of MPT’s monopoly and the beginning for multiple 
operators in China’s fixed-line market.  
 
After the foundation of China Unicom, an increasing number of new players 
entered China’s telecommunications market (See Figure 5). In the fixed-line 
market, China Railcom, backed by MOR, was established in 2000 to counter 
China Telecom’s dominance, and China Telecom was split into China Telecom 
and China Netcom in 2002. In the mobile market, China mobile was segregated 
from China Telecom in 1999. Although China Telecom and China Netcom did not 
have licenses for the mobile business, they were allowed to run the PHS service, 
which has limited mobility. As for China Unicom, it was the only fully licensed 
telecommunications operator that covered both fixed-line and mobile services. 
Finally, there were at least three major telecommunications operators in China’s 













Through this restructuring, five major state-owned telecommunications operators, 
China Telecom, China Netcom, China Railcom, China Unicom and China Mobile, 
were allocated different service sectors of the national telecommunications market. 
In almost all the basic telecommunications service sectors, there were at least four 
competitors (See Table 2). In particular, China Mobile and China Unicom 
maintained tight competition in the mobile business, while China Telecom and 
China Netcom also provided PHS services. In local voice services and distant 
transmission business, China Telecom and China Netcom were major competitors, 
while China Unicom and China Railcom maintained a smaller market share. All of 
the five telecommunications operators competed with one another in international 
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data and voice services, the Internet, and other value-added services. 
 











Mobile business * * * *  
Local network access and 
phone calls 
 * * * * 
Distant transmission business  * * * * 
DDN and international phone 
calls 
* * * * * 
Distant data and internet trunk 
business 
* * * * * 
Data and Internet value-added 
business 
* * * * * 
*Stands for competitor 
Source: III China Telecom & IT Report, June 2002 
 
However, the early competition in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets was 
restricted by territories, technologies, and licenses. For example, in the fixed-line 
market, China Telecom and China Netcom’s local voice services were relatively 
isolated in their own territories (See Figure 6). In the mobile market, China 
Mobile has dominance in GSM services, while China Unicom is dedicated in 
CDMA services. China Telecom and China Netcom also provide PHS services 
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with limited mobility, but their services are focused on urban areas. In addition, 
China’s telecommunications operators except China Unicom currently do not have 
the license to run mobile and local voice services simultaneously.  
 
Figure 6 Fixed-line service territories for China Telecom and China Netcom in 
2002. 
 
Source: (2003). China' s Telecom Operators: An analysis of some of the world's 
largest operators. Shanghai, Swedish Trade Council Shanghai IT & Telecom 
Team. 
 
However, these restrictions were largely eliminated within a few years. In the 
fixed-line market, China Telecom and China Netcom have extended their services 
into each other’s territories since the end of 2002. In the mobile market, voice 
services and Short Message Services (SMS) on GSM, CDMA, and PHS networks 
have been able to communicate with one other since 2003. Moreover, compared 
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with other operators, China Unicom, as the sole full-scale telecommunications 
operator, essentially placed its emphasis on the mobile market rather than on the 
fixed-line market. In addition, operators even ran their business outside their 
permitted sectors, such as China Telecom and China Netcom in the mobile market. 
Therefore, the impact of territory, technology, and license restrictions on China’s 
telecommunications competition is limited, and so will be excluded from my 
regression models. 
 
Another important event concerning China’s telecommunications competition was 
the opening up of China’s domestic telecommunications market to foreign 
operators. At the end of 2001, China joined the WTO and committed to open its 
domestic telecommunications market to foreign investors. Nevertheless, the 
impact of opening up on the competition in China’s domestic telecommunications 
market was not as strong as had been expected. The ownership restriction in the 
Sino-US agreement (See Table 3) avoided direct competition between foreign and 
domestic telecommunication companies. Foreign investors were only allowed to 
build joint ventures in order to enter China’s markets, and foreign capital could 
only make up to 50% of the equity share of a joint venture, which meant that they 
could not separately control decisions and operations. The scale and growth rate 
of foreign investment in joint ventures would also be limited by the scale and 
growth rate of its Chinese partners (Kong 2003). 
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Table 2: Schedule of opening China’s domestic telecommunication market upon 













30% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Within one year 14 cities 49% No limit for the number 
of business operators 













<30% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Within one year 14 cities 49% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Paging 
Services 









25% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
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Within one year 14 cities <35% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Within three 
years 
14 cities 49% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Within five 
years 






25% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Within five 
years 
14 cities <35% No limit for the number 
of business operators 
within the area 
Domesti
c & Intl. 
Comm. 
Business 
Within six years No area limit <49%  
Source: China Telecom & IT Report, June 2002. 
 
Therefore, China’s accession to WTO did not pose a real threat to domestic 
operators, and its influences on China’s telecommunications competition are also 
excluded in my regression models. 
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3.2 Telecommunications Deregulation 
The purpose of deregulation is to eliminate economic inefficiency by reducing the 
intensity of government regulation and enhancing efficiency through promoting 
competition. Specifically, telecommunications deregulation often includes the 
removal of entry barriers, the free choice of service operators, penalty rules for 
monopoly, price monitoring, interconnection provisions, and independence of 
regulators. These items are essential to reduce government intervention on regular 
market activities, and prevent dominant operators from abusing their position by 
fixing prices below cost, controlling supplies, or raising interconnection fees so as 
to narrow service operators’ margins. Deregulation is also intended to ensure that 
the price can signal a real change in terms of supply and demand. In this way, a 
loss in efficiency and social welfare caused by distorted pricing can largely be 
avoided. 
 
Following remarkable restructuring in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets, a 
new ministry, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) replaced MPT in 1998 
(See Figure 7). After this move, the previous rigid hierarchy and strict control of 
MPT was relaxed. Around 2000, all the local branches of MPT, the PTAs, were 
dismissed, and local communication administrations were established as 
independent regulators of local communications. After 2004, all major 
telecommunication players were transferred to SASAC. This was a milestone in 
the deregulation process, leading to the separating of administration and business 
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operations. Once telecommunication players and regulators were released from 
their ownership relationship, their behaviors were expected to be similar to those 
in a market environment, and their efficiency was expected to improve. 
 
Figure 7. Deregulation of China’s telecommunications market. 
 
 
In 2000, the “Regulations on Telecommunication” (Telecom Regulations) 
document was issued by the State Council. The Telecom Regulations confirmed 
MII’s role as an independent regulator, and stipulated that MII could not be 
involved in the operation of telecommunication enterprises. Generally, the 
Telecom Regulations paper confirmed the Chinese government’s attitude toward 
deregulation, and was thought to be allied to WTO rules (chiefly the BTA, Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement), but the current prohibitive practice regarding 
foreign investment still continues (Harwit and Clark 2001). The practice of 
promoting transparent and nondiscriminatory protocol has also not been 
satisfactorily observed as yet. This is probably so as to protect domestic industries, 
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and to obstruct the potential entry of foreign enterprises before domestic 
enterprises can fully adapt to international competition. 
 
In reality, MII’s role is not as independent as the ideal one outlined by BTA. 
BTA’s provisions actually leave considerable room for strong-handed intervention 
by MII (Zhang and Peng 2000). For instance, BTA allows telecommunications 
regulators to grant telecommunications licenses. Therefore, MII has the power to 
control telecom competition by manipulating its licensing authority. Since most of 
China’s domestic carriers are state-owned rather than private, MII has strong 
structural, political, and economic incentives that favor Chinese carriers (Zhang 
and Peng 2000).  
 
Moreover, MII still had other policy objectives beyond its legal functions (Ure 
2002). Thus, when MII’s regulatory duty and its policy-making function are 
contradictory, it cannot ensure an effective supervision. In other words, we cannot 
expect a government agency to give the same degree of importance to both 
efficiency and equality objectives. In fact, in an economy as huge as China’s, 
deregulation is hardly likely to eliminate the state’s influence on the economy. 
This is also consistent with the arguments of Alexander and Estache (2000) that 
relate to telecommunications regulator’s unvoiced manner of controlling the 
market with political intentions.  
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Besides, there are several premises in the short run for establishing an independent 
regulatory agency, which has never existed in China: A national 
telecommunications law to authorize and direct an independent regulatory agency, 
a mechanism to assure both effective supervision and balance, and a proper 
personnel system to support (Ure 2002). First, China has made its proposal for the 
legislation of a telecommunications law in 1980, but it still remains at the draft 
instead of moving to the publishing stage. Thus, there is no legal foundation for 
establishing an independent regulatory agency. Second, China does not have 
abundant experience in independent regulation. In China, the market mechanism 
and regulation skills were introduced only a few years ago. Third, China also 
lacks human resources for an independent regulatory agency, and it needs time to 
training and people familiarize itself with a new regulatory system. 
 
Essentially, during the high telecommunications growth period from the 1990s, 
the government’s pursuit of economic growth and development has always been 
coupled with the underlying objectives of maintaining stability and protecting 
centralized control. Thus, any further decentralization and autonomy would be 
limited under the central government’s control (Mueller and Tan 1997). Instead of 
taking the economic and political risks of establishing a brand new competition 
environment and regulatory system, the optimization of duopoly or triopoly 
competition in telecommunications service sectors, and the optimization of MII’s 
regulatory policies are preferred by the present Chinese government. For this 
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government, the creation of a set of sound polices, including competitive market 
rules, a complete legal system, an open and transparent policy-making mechanism, 
and other such measures are more important than fully open telecommunications 
competition or a complete deregulation of the telecommunications market. 
 
 
In summary, since the introduction of competition and deregulation in China’s 
fixed-line and mobile markets in 1994, the Chinese government has continued to 
push for progress in competition and deregulation. Compared with the monopoly 
control and strict surveillance over the telecommunications industry prior to 1994, 
China’s current fixed-line and mobile markets are under competition with multiple 
operators and enjoy relaxed regulations provided by MII. Referring to the 
predictions of previous studies, competition could improve telecommunications 
growth while the role of deregulation is as yet uncertain. Owing to the rare 
empirical evidence of the effects of competition and deregulation on China’s 
telecommunications growth, empirical analysis is required to identify those effects 
that arise in practice. The dataset and methodology underlying my empirical 
analysis are described in the following section. 
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Chapter 4: Econometric Model and Hypothesis 
 
4.1 Data 
The dataset used in this thesis contains information from two groups of samples: 
the fixed-line sample and the mobile sample. The fixed-line sample consists of 
111 sample cities for the period of 1984–2004, while the mobile sample consists 
of 117 sample cities for the period of 1990–2004. These sample cities are selected 
from China’s total 295 cities in 1984, out of which cities that have been greatly 
merged or split in the 1984–2004 period are exempted, so as to avoid the 
disturbance caused by sharp changes in population and territory. These sample 
cities cover 77% and 79% of the sum of China’s urban population and 
non-agricultural population in 1984 and 2004 respectively. Hence, they are able to 
reflect the overall performance of fixed-line and mobile markets in Chinese cities. 
The complete dataset includes information on subscribers, population, GDP, 
competition, and deregulation of both fixed-line and mobile sample cities. 
 
The data come from different sources. The number of fixed-line subscribers 
(thousand people), the number of mobile subscribers (thousand people), 
population size (thousand people), and GDP (billion Chinese Yuan) for each 
sample city were obtained from the China City Statistical Yearbook (1985–2005) 
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and the commercial database China Infobank. Qualitative variables for 
competition and deregulation were derived from a combination of sources, such as 
the Ministry of Information Industry website, http://www.mii.gov.cn, the National 
Bureau of Statistics website, http://www.stats.gov.cn, China Telecommunications 
Yearbook (2001–2005), Yearbook of China communications (2003–2005), and 
Statistical Yearbook of Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets (1998–2005). All the 
data were pooled into two panels of time series, one for fixed-line sample cities 
and one for mobile sample cities. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
My goal is to identify the impact of competition and deregulation on China’s 
telecommunications growth in subscribers. To isolate the effects of competition 
and deregulation, it is important to control for other factors that may influence the 
growth of telecommunications subscribers. Therefore, I control for different city 
characteristics such as population and GDP per capita. I also use terms derived 
from Logistic and Gompertz equations to control for the non-linear diffusion trend 
of the growth of telecommunications subscribers. After accounting for these 
factors, some relevant variation will inevitably remain. To capture any residual 
systematic variation, I assumed that a fixed-effect exists among certain cities. I 
also introduced a year-specific dummy to capture the macroeconomic factors that 
vary over time but do not vary across cities in the same year. These factors can be 
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interest rates, technological progresses, and so on. This fixed-effect approach is to 
limit the likelihood of attributing the growth of telecommunications subscribers to 
competition and deregulation, which is actually caused by other phenomena. 
 
Pool regression, which has been adopted in similar studies, has often been cited as 
a powerful tool to undertake regression analysis on telecommunications growth 
(Stimon, 1985; Wooldridge, 2001; Bagchi et al., 2003). In this thesis, I intend to 
use two fixed-effect linear regression models to do pool regression with the OLS 
method. In particular, to integrate diffusion effect of telecommunications growth 
in subscribers, I use the Logistic and Gompertz equations mentioned in Chapter 2 
as the mainframe and diffusion estimator in my regression models. The Logistic 
and Gompertz equations referred to are as follows: 
 
Logistic: 
( ) ( )[ ]1,,1,, lnlnlnln −− −−−+=− tiitiiititi YLYLAYY ……………………………...   
Gompertz: 
( )1,1,, lnlnlnln −− −=− tiiititi YLkYY .......................................................................   
 
In equation , although the term 
 ( ) ( )1,, lnln −−−− tiitii YLYL  has a linear 
correlation with the term 1,, lnln −− titi YY on the left side, the growth of tiY ,  
actually follows a non-linear S-shape Logistic diffusion curve as was illustrated in 
Chapter 2. Similarly, in equation , 

ik is defined by the Gompertz curve as a 
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positive constant value, reflecting the linear relationship between the terms 
1,, lnln −− titi YY  and 1,lnln −− tii YL . Also, tiY ,  in equation  also follows a 

non-linear S-shape Gompertz diffusion curve. Therefore, in equations  and , 
 
the terms ( ) ( )1,, lnln −−−− tiitii YLYL  and 1,lnln −− tii YL  that are linearly 
correlated with the term 1,, lnln −− titi YY  can be used to capture the non-linear 
diffusion trend of growth of tiY , . 
 
Here I assume variable tiY ,  in equation  and  i
 
s the indicator for China’s 
telecommunications output, which denotes the number of telecommunications 
subscribers in Chinese city i in year t . Referring to equations  and , 
 
tiY ,ln  
is the natural logarithm of the number of subscribers in city i  in year t , and 




 when it is small, can be deemed as the growth rate 
of tiY ,ln  over the period from 1−t  to t . In other words, variables on the right 
sides of equations  and  can be used to estimate their effects on accelerating 
 
the growth of telecommunications subscribers.  
 
Hence, taking 1,, lnln −− titi YY  as the main dependent variable, we can add other 
variables on the right sides of equations  and  to unrave
 
l the determinants of 
telecommunications growth. In my regression models, I will add independent 
variables for macro economy, population growth, competition, and deregulation 
on the right sides of equations  and . 
 
So my fixed-effect approach gives rise 
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to estimating equations of the form: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]1,,1,1,, lnlnlnln −− −−−+=− tiitiitititi YLYLYY βα  
1,,31,,2 ln(ln)ln(ln −− −+−+ tiittiti poppopgdpgdp ββ  
titttiti Tdregcom ,,5,4 εµββ ++++ …………………………...   
)ln(lnlnln 1,1,1,, −− −+=− tiitititi YLYY βα  
)ln(ln)ln(ln 1,,31,,2 −− −+−+ tiittiti poppopgdpgdp ββ  
    titttiti Tdregcom ,,5,4 εµββ ++++ …………………………...   
The variable tiY ,  in equations   and   is the number of telecommunications 
subscribers in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets. For the fixed-line sample, 
these subscribers include registered subscribers who have a mainline connecting 
the subscriber's terminal equipment to the PSTN, with a dedicated port in the 
exchange equipment. For the mobile sample, these subscribers include registered 
prepaid and post-paid mobile and PHS subscribers. 
 
Besides telecommunications subscribers, there are some alternative indicators of 
telecommunications output. For example, the revenue of telecommunications 
operators and the scale of telecommunications infrastructure (e.g. the number of 
telephones) can also reflect telecommunications output. However, when there is a 
monopoly in the telecommunications market, revenue is not convincing in 
showing the real output, because the price can be distorted by the monopolist. In 
addition, when infrastructures are not fully utilized or over-loaded, real output will 
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be lower or higher than the indicator would exhibit. Comparatively, the number of 
subscribers is a more applicable item to measure the real output. Subscribers are 
the major source of telecommunications revenue. Moreover, no matter whether 
infrastructures are idle or overloaded, the number of subscribers can effectively 
reflect the business volume of telecommunications services. 
 
In equations   and  , ti,α and ti ,ε are the constant and error terms, respectively. 
iT is the year-specific dummy variable. The term ( ) ( )1,, lnln −−−− tiitii YLYL  in 
equation  , and the term 1,lnln −− tii YL  in equation   are diffusion estimators 
of the aforementioned Logistic and Gompertz equations, where iL is the upper 
limit of tiY ,  in city i .  
 
Among various indicators, population was a natural estimator of iL . However, 
underestimation of iL  will steepen the growth curve and let the curve reach the 
turning point too early. On the contrary, overestimation of iL  will flatten the 
growth curve and let the curve reach the turning point too late.  In my samples, 
the population of city i in year 0=t , 0,ipop , is around 80% of city i ’s 
population in 2004. To compare the differences of adopting different year’s 
population as the estimator of iL , I ran preliminary tests with 0,ii popL =  for 
both fixed=line and mobile samples, 19,ii popL =  for fixed-line samples, and 
14,ii popL =  for mobile samples. Results of these preliminary tests shown that 
turning points of fixed-line growth curves converged to a narrow range of 
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2000-2002 and turning points of mobile growth curves converged to a narrow 
range of 2002-2004. Therefore, there are only little differences in choosing 
different year’s population as the estimator of iL  in my empirical model. 
Concerning a large part of Chinese cities experienced intensive merge and split in 
mid 1990s, it would be more reliable to use 0,ipop  as the estimator of iL .   
 
Then, equation   and   can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )[ ]1,0,,0,1,1,, lnlnlnln −− −−−+=− tiitiitititi YpopYpopYY βα  
1,,31,,2 ln(ln)ln(ln −− −+−+ titititi poppopgdpgdp ββ  
titttiti Tdregcom ,,5,4 εµββ ++++ …………………………...   
)ln(lnlnln 1,0,1,1,, −− −+=− tiitititi YpopYY βα  
)ln(ln)ln(ln 1,,31,,2 −− −+−+ tiittiti poppopgdpgdp ββ  
    titttiti Tdregcom ,,5,4 εµββ ++++ …………………………...   
 
In equations   and  , the terms ( ) ( )1,0,,0, lnln −−−− tiitii YpopYpop  and 
1,0, lnln −− tii Ypop  capture the non-linear diffusion effect, while other variables 
remain the same as in equations   and . 

The diffusion effect here stands for the 
residual effect that can not be explained by population growth, income growth, 
competition, and deregulation in equations   and 

. In a typical Logistic and 
Gompertz equations, the growth of telecommunications subscribers was simulated 
by a non-linear S-shape curve. This kind of growth is thought to be pushed by the 
diffusion of information, technology, and services among subscribers and potential 
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subscribers. The terms ( ) ( )1,0,,0, lnln −−−− tiitii YpopYpop  and 1,0, lnln −− tii Ypop  
extracted from Logistic and Gompertz equations thus are used to capture this 
residual effect, which is called as the diffusion effect. 
 
Compared with developed countries, China is still in the early stages of 
telecommunications development, and its penetration rate of telecommunications 
services is still low. For the most part, the early development stage and low 
penetration rate of China’s telecommunications growth fit the preconditions for 
showing strong diffusion characteristics, as explained in Chapter 2. Therefore, the 
coefficients for the diffusion indicators in equations   and   are expected to be 
significant. 
 
Since tiY ,  is supposed to follow the S-shape diffusion curve, and 0,ipop  is the 
upper limit of telecommunications diffusion, we have the 



















true in both equations   and  . In equation  , 







































Ypop . Therefore, by assuming that diffusion has a 




H1: 1β is significant. Moreover, 1β  is negative in the Logistic equation and 
positive in the Gompertz equation. 
 
In equations   and  , tigdp ,ln  is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 
Chinese Yuan of city i in year t , and 1,ln −tigdp is its lagged variable for the previous 
year. 1,, lnln −− titi gdpgdp  denotes the growth rate of income in city i  over the 
period from 1−t  to t . As the income level exhibits positive growth, the demand 
for overall telecommunications services is expected to increase. However, for 
specific service sectors, increasing telecommunications demands may generate 
different results, depending on the interaction between fixed-line and mobile 
services. Since mobile services are more convenient and dynamic than fixed-line 
services, they are usually seen as strong competitors and substitutes for fixed-line 
services. Therefore, if the substitution effect of mobile services for fixed-line 
services is strong enough, an increasing telecommunications demand would 
accelerate the growth of mobile subscribers but in turn slow down the growth of 
fixed-line subscribers. Or else, if the substitution effect of mobile services on 
fixed-line services were not very strong, an increasing telecommunications 
demand would accelerate both the growth of mobile and fixed-line subscribers. 
Accordingly, the correlation of income growth with the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers can be either positive or negative. 
 
tipop ,ln  is the natural logarithm of registered total population of city i in year t , 
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and 1,ln −tipop is its lagged variable for the previous year. The term 
1,, lnln −− titi poppop denotes the growth rate of population in city i  over the 
period from 1−t  to t . A positive growth in population leads to the expansion of 
potential subscribers, which brings about the surge in demand for 
telecommunications. The increasing telecommunications demand brought about 
by population growth is expected to influence the growth of mobile and fixed-line 
subscribers in a similar way as would a demand induced by a growth in income. 
 
The impact of population growth on the growth of telecommunications 
subscribers in specific service sectors could also be affected by the interactions 
between mobile and fixed-line services, and should also vary across different 
income levels. While the income level is high enough to enable potential 
subscribers to apply for mobile services, a larger portion of increased potential 
subscribers would be attracted by mobile serves rather than fixed-line services. It 
is also common for a single subscriber to own several mobile devices but only one 
fixed-line. Especially, increased new potential subscribers usually are new 
generations, whose family has already signed fixed-line services. Thus, growth of 
population should accelerate the growth of mobile subscribers, leaving the growth 
of fixed-line subscribers at a much lower speed. In sum, the growth of population 
1,, lnln −− titi poppop  is expected to have positive correlation with the growth of 
mobile subscribers by accelerating its expansion, but negative correlation with the 
growth of fixed-line subscribers by slowdown its spread.  
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Otherwise, if the income level was still too low, mobile services could not 
substantially threaten fixed-line services. Therefore, the growth of population 
would accelerate both the growth of fixed-line and mobile subscribers. 
Accordingly, the correlation of population growth with the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers can be either positive or negative. 
 
ticom ,  is the competition indicator in equations   and  , and is a dummy 
variable that becomes one when the mobile or fixed-line market in city i in year 
t  has at least two operators. Otherwise, c is equal to zero. For city i  in year t , 
ticom ,  of fixed-line market and mobile market are constructed separately and are 
expected to exert different impacts on their respective markets. However, in 
general, the market structure has changed from a monopoly to open competition 
since the number of operators has increased. Competition is expected to reduce 
service prices and improve operators’ efficiency. Therefore, the coefficient of 
ticom ,  should be positive. This assumption will lead us to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: 04 >β  
 
tidreg ,  is a dummy variable that captures the presence of deregulation policies in 
the mobile or fixed-line market in city i  in year t . tireg ,  becomes one when 
city i  in year t adopts at least one deregulation policy, and zero otherwise. For 
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city i  in year t , tireg ,  of fixed-line market and mobile market are constructed 
separately and are expected to exert different impacts on their respective markets. 
Categories of deregulation policies that are recognized are listed below: 
1. Policies for dividing telecommunications from postal business in 1998. 
2. Policies for permitting the split up of China Telecom and the establishment 
of other telecommunications operators from 1999–2004. 
3. Policies for dismissing local PTAs and establishing MII provincial 
branches as independent local telecommunications regulators from 
1998–2000. 
4. Policies for permitting test cities to extend e-commerce, based on local 
economic and financial requirements in 2000. 
5. Policies for opening up Customer Premises Network (CPN) commercial 
operations in test cities for local interconnection in 2001. 
6. Policies for opening up commercial 3G operations in test cities from 
2001–2004 
7. Policies for implementing informationization in test cities, which allowed 
cities to make plans independent of infrastructures under development, 
telecommunications investment, or industrial and administration 
applications in 2002. 
8. Policies for telecommunications charges inspection and pricing adjustment 
in 2002–2003, which allowed telecommunications prices to be partially 
decided by the market. 
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9. Policies for village telephony installation projects in 2004, while allowing 
multiple operators to enter the basic rural telecommunications market. 
 
tidreg ,  could be either positively or negatively correlated with the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers, depending on whether it improves competition. 
For example, in some cases deregulation grants local administrators the power to 
manage local network, but the interconnections among different networks are still 
under the control of centralized authorities. As a result, interconnection fee in 
long-distance telecommunications services actually increased during deregulation, 
which hindered the competition and the growth of subscribers.  
 
Moreover, I add two more variables, tiDiffCom ,  and tiDiffDreg ,  to estimate the 
combined effects of diffusion, competition, and deregulation. tiDiffCom ,  is the 
product of the diffusion estimator and the competition estimator, while 
tiDiffDreg ,  is the product of the diffusion estimator and the deregulation 
estimator. For example, in equation  , 
( ) ( )[ ] titiitiiti comYpopYpopDiffCom ,1,0,,0,, *lnln −−−−= . It is easy to see that 
tiDiffCom , is equal to the diffusion estimator when 1, =ticom  but equal to zero 
when 0
,
=ticom . Thus, different regression results of the coefficient of tiDiffCom ,  
could disclose that whether the introduction of competition has the effect of 
enhancing or harming the diffusion. When there is no competition, this kind of 
effect also does not exist. The construction of tiDiffCom ,  and tiDiffDreg ,  
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follows in the same way, generating two new equations as following: 
( ) ( )[ ]1,0,,0,1,1,, lnlnlnln −− −−−+=− tiitiitititi YpopYpopYY βα  
1,,31,,2 ln(ln)ln(ln −− −+−+ titititi poppopgdpgdp ββ  
titttiti TDiffDregDiffComdregcom ,76,5,4 εµββββ ++++++   
)ln(lnlnln 1,0,1,1,, −− −+=− tiitititi YpopYY βα  
)ln(ln)ln(ln 1,,31,,2 −− −+−+ tiittiti poppopgdpgdp ββ  
    titttiti TDiffDregDiffComdregcom ,76,5,4 εµββββ ++++++   
 
The particular definitions of tiDiffCom ,  and tiDiffDreg , are as following: in 
equation 

, we have ( ) ( )[ ] titiitiiti comYpopYpopDiffCom ,1,0,,0,, *lnln −−−−= , and 
( ) ( )[ ] titiitiiti dregYpopYpopDiffDreg ,1,0,,0,, *lnln −−−−= , in equation  , we 
have titiiti comYpopDiffCom ,1,0,, *)ln(ln −−= , and 
titiiti dregYpopDiffDreg ,1,0,, *)ln(ln −−= .  
 
Following hypotheses H1 and H2, here I assume tiDiffCom ,  has positive 
correlation with the growth of subscribers. This assumption implies that the 
introduction of competition will enhance the diffusion. Since diffusion is expected 
to accelerate the growth of telecommunications subscribers, a new hypothesis for 
tiDiffCom ,  is: 
H3: 06 >β  
 
In sum, I have three hypotheses:  
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H1: 1β is significant, implying China’s telecommunications growth in subscribers 
has significant diffusion characteristics.  
H2: 04 >β , implying that the introduction of competition spurs the growth of 
telecommunications subscribers.  
H3: 06 >β , implying that the introduction of competition should enhance the 
diffusion characteristic, and finally spur the growth of telecommunications 
subscribers. 
As for other tested variables in equations  and , it is not certain what k
 
ind of 
impact they would have on the growth in the number of China’s 
telecommunications subscribers. 
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Chapter 5: Results and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Results 
I performed regressions for the mobile sample and the fixed-line sample 
separately to estimate the impact of deregulation and competition on the growth of 
mainline telephone subscribers and mobile subscribers. The estimation results of 
equations   and ﬀ  are presented in the following tables. 
 
Table 3. Results for the fixed-line sample. 
 Equation ﬁ  – Logistic Equation ﬂ  - Gompertz 
Variable Coefficient t p-value Coefficient t p-value 
Diffusion -1.758862 -7.58 0.000* .3380745 18.42 0.000* 
Income growth .0211746 0.49 0.626 -.0221506 -0.86 0.388 
Population growth -.8082962 -1.82 0.069 -.5436551 -1.38 0.169 
Competition .0300349 0.42 0.676 .1483548 1.46 0.144 
Deregulation -.0418326 -1.07 0.283 .0807396 0.58 0.565 
Diffusion*Competition 1.386047 5.63 0.000* .0398994 2.77 0.006* 
Diffusion*Deregulation -.1725715 -0.84 0.401 .0163347 0.77 0.440 
Constant .1442556 1.89 0.059 1.049604 21.52 0.000* 
R square 0.4599   0.5534   
*=significant at 5% 
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Table 3 presents the results for regression for the fixed-line sample, using 




1) As Table 3 shows, the coefficients of diffusion terms derived from the Logistic 
and Gompertz curves are both significant. The coefficient of the Logistic equation 
is significantly negative, while the coefficient of the Gompertz equation is 
significantly positive, strongly supporting hypothesis H1. In fact, the significance 
of diffusion terms indicates that telecommunications diffusion is closely 
associated with the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers. Thus, from 
1984–2004, the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers should mainly follow the 
diffusion trend. According to the definition of both the Logistic and Gompertz 
curves, this trend follows an S-shape curve. The strong diffusion effect also 
implies that China is still in the early stages of the growth of telecommunications 
subscribers, and the future growth of China’s telecommunications subscribers is 
expected to be more stable.  
 
2) The coefficients of competition variables are positive in Table 3. However, both 
of them are not significant. The coefficients of deregulation and the combined 
effect of deregulation and diffusion are also insignificant, meaning that the effects 
of competition, deregulation, and the combined effect of deregulation and 
diffusion on the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers are still not certain. 
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3). As H3 predicts, the combined effect of competition and diffusion was found to 
have a positive correlation with the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers. 
Moreover, these effects are significant. It is interesting that, in the same regression 
model, the competition variable itself does not have a significant effect on the 
growth of telecommunications subscribers. A possible explanation is that 
competition increased the number of fixed-line operators, thus increasing the rate 
of spreading information to potential subscribers and improving diffusion. 
Although in the initial stages, it is hard for fixed-line operators to expand their 
user base immediately, the improved diffusion brought about by competition 
boosted the growth of telecommunications subscribers, following an S-shape 
growth curve. On this curve in the early growth stages, a current period’s growth 
of fixed-line subscribers will accelerate the next period’s growth of fixed-line 
subscribers.  
 
Similar to the findings of preceding studies, the growth of income and population 
do not have a significant impact on the growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers in 
Table 3.  
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Table 4. Results for the mobile sample. 
 Equation  
ﬃ
– Logistic Equation  

- Gompertz 
Variable Coefficient t p-value Coefficient t p-value 
Diffusion -.2276121 -1.03 0.305 .4700715 22.26 0.000* 
Income growth .0317198 0.72 0.470 .0115911 0.29 0.769 
Population growth .2178287 0.49 0.625 .4747951 1.19 0.234 
Competition .0276649 0.59 0.558 .062573 0.95 0.341 
Deregulation .0179632 0.55 0.585 .1083383 1.01 0.315 
Diffusion*Competition -.3433234 -1.51 0.132 .0074079 0.61 0.544 
Diffusion*Deregulation .4731492 5.09 0.000* .0203108 1.18 0.238 
Constant .8308319 21.82 0.000* -.5609565 -8.02 0.000* 
R square 0.7291   0.7826   
*=significant at 5% 
 
Table 4 lists the results of regressions with equations  and  for China’s mobile 
 
sample cities. From this table, hypotheses H1 is supported by the results of 
equation ﬀ  integrated with the Gompertz diffusion curve. The results of both   
and ﬀ  seem to be consistent with Hypothesis H2, but the coefficients are not 
significant. Hypothesis H3 is not supported by the results of equation   
integrated with the Logistic diffusion curve. 
 
Compared with the results shown in Table 3, it is interesting that the major 
differences are all produced by the equation integrated with the Logistic curve:   
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1) The impact of diffusion on the growth of subscribers becomes insignificant.  
2) The coefficient of the combined effect of deregulation and diffusion turned out 
to be significant. 
 
However, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Logistic curve is a symmetric S-shape 
curve while the Gompertz curve is asymmetric. Thus, the Logistic curve may 
encounter problems in simulating asymmetric S-shape diffusion curves. Referring 
to the growth track of China’s mobile subscribers illustrated by Figure 1, this is 
asymmetric compared with the growth track of China’s fixed-line subscribers. 
Also in Figure 2, the growth rate of China’s mobile subscribers is extremely high 
before 1996, due to the initial subscription of mobile services, which was mainly 
driven by operators’ business strategies. Therefore, it is possible that the Logistic 
curve does not fit the diffusion trend in China’s mobile market very well during 
the period 1990–1995. 
 
To avoid any disturbance caused by operator strategies in early mobile 
subscription, and to smoothen the growth track of China’s mobile subscribers, I 
dropped the observations from 1990–1995 for the mobile sample. Thus, the 
growth track of China’s mobile subscribers is close to a symmetric S-shape curve 
from 1996–2004. I formulated the regression again, using equation . The results 

are listed below in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Results for the mobile sample. 
 Equation  
ﬃ
– 1990–2004 Equation  
ﬃ
– 1996–2004 
Variable Coefficient t p-value Coefficient t p-value 
Diffusion -.2276121 -1.03 0.305 -.4661096 -2.05 0.040* 
Income growth .0317198 0.72 0.470 -.0195987 -0.13 0.895 
Population growth .2178287 0.49 0.625 .830795 1.59 0.112 
Competition .0276649 0.59 0.558 .0273087 0.63 0.527 
Deregulation .0179632 0.55 0.585 .0347139 1.16 0.247 
Diffusion*Competition -.3433234 -1.51 0.132 -.2141541 -0.92 0.356 
Diffusion*Deregulation .4731492 5.09 0.000* .5503276 6.46 0.000* 
Constant .8308319 21.82 0.000* .5371071 17.33 0.000* 
R square 0.7291   0.5683   
*=significant at 5% 
 
It can be seen from Table 5 that, the regression results of equation  for the 

sample period 1996–2004 are mainly consistent with my hypotheses except H3.  
Compared with the regression results of equation  for the sample period 

1990–2004, the results listed in Table 5 are consistent with other regression results 
for China’s fixed-line and mobile markets in Tables 5 and 6. The diffusion effect 
becomes significant. The coefficient of competition remains positive and 
insignificant. The combined effect of diffusion and competition is still negative, 
but is insignificant. Income growth, population growth, and deregulation variables 
are still insignificant. 
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Nevertheless, the coefficient of the combined effect of diffusion and deregulation 
is still positive and significant, implying that the introduction of deregulation has 
unique power in China’s mobile markets to enhance diffusion and to accelerate the 
growth of mobile subscribers. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
This thesis has reviewed and analyzed the progress of competition and 
deregulation in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets from 1984–2004. In 1994, 
competition and deregulation was first introduced into China’s 
telecommunications industry, which was under monopoly control and strict 
surveillance at that time. Since then, a series of pro-competition and deregulation 
policies have opened a new age of multiple operators and relaxed regulation in 
China’s fixed-line and mobile markets. Following these deep changes, China has 
experienced a remarkable growth in the number of fixed-line and mobile 
subscribers. 
 
Using the fixed-line data of 111 sample cities for the 1984–2004 period, and the 
mobile data of 117 sample cities for the 1990–2004 period, this thesis 
implemented a study on the impact of competition and deregulation on the growth 
of China’s fixed-line and mobile subscribers. In this study, two fixed-effect 
 71 
models, integrated with Logistic and Gompertz diffusion curves, were developed 
to examine the roles of competition, deregulation, a macro economy, and 
population growth in China’s fixed-line and mobile growth. 
 
The empirical results of this study support the theory that telecommunications 
growth has a diffusion nature, which inherently promotes the future growth of 
subscribers. Furthermore, compared with the weak effects of macroeconomic and 
demographical factors, competition has played an important role in accelerating 
the growth of China’s telecommunications subscribers, especially when it was 
combined with telecommunications diffusion in the fixed-line market.  
 
However, both competition and deregulation themselves were not found to have a 
significant impact on the growth of China’s telecommunications subscribers. This 
point is of interest particularly since competition and deregulation were usually 
considered to have a direct impact on improving telecommunications growth in 
other countries. The logic behind this may be that, China’s macro economy also 
exhibits strong growth during 1990–2004. As Jha and Mahumdar (1999) pointed 
out, strong macroeconomic condition sometime may exaggerate the power of 
telecommunications competition. Similarly, strong macroeconomic condition may 
also exaggerate the power of telecommunications deregulation. Thus, it is possible 
that China’s boosted macro economy makes the competition and deregulation in 
fixed-line and mobile markets appear effective.  
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Although the direct impact of competition on China’s fixed-line and mobile 
growth is not significant, it is found to have significant positive effects when 
combined with diffusion in the fixed-line market. It implies that competition 
improved the diffusion of China’s fixed-line growth, and in turn boosted the 
growth of China’s fixed-line subscribers. Moreover, the fixed-line market has a 
significant economy of scale and was mostly under monopoly control before the 
introduction of competition. As a result, the impact of competition on fixed-line 
growth is much stronger compared to the impact of competition on the growth of 
mobile subscribers. 
 
One interesting thing is that deregulation was found to enhance the diffusion of 
subscribers’ growth in China’s mobile market. One reason is that mobile services 
are more flexible than fixed-line services. Thus, mobile operators prefer a free 
market environment so as to achieve a high efficiency. As a result, deregulation is 
assumed to have a larger impact on the mobile market. Considering the delay in 
deregulation, deregulation in China’s mobile market may have exerted its effects 
since the late 1990s. Thus, it is possible that the Logistic curve is more sensitive to 
the delayed effects of deregulation on China’s mobile market for the period of 
1996–2004. The Gompertz curve may be more suitable to fit the asymmetric 




The important lesson of this study is that the Chinese government should insist on 
improving competition and deregulation in its fixed-line and mobile markets. 
Although there is no strong empirical proof to support the assumption that 
competition and deregulation have a direct impact in accelerating the growth of 
subscribers in China’s fixed-line and mobile markets, these two factors cannot be 
simply omitted. As my models predict, competition and diffusion exert their 
potency through the combination of telecommunications diffusion. In particular, 
in the fixed-line market, having multiple operators combined with diffusion 
presents a higher efficiency in improving the growth of subscribers than a 
monopoly did. In the mobile market, having deregulation with diffusion presents a 
higher efficiency in improving the growth of subscribers than strict surveillance 
did in the past. 
 
In the future, it is believed that the analytical framework adopted by this thesis 
will have to be modified or refined. Just as shown by the differences in the results 
of regression equations integrated with the Logistic and Gompertz curves for the 
same sample, both these two empirical models in my thesis do not perfectly 
capture all effects that influence telecommunications growth in subscribers. In 
particular, existing effects of competition and deregulation will become more 
complex when the diffusion characteristics of the growth of China’s 
telecommunications subscribers become less significant in the advanced 
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development stage. As a result, the impact of competition and deregulation may 
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